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I have been struck by the fact that there is much similarity between 
the way in which Dr. I, a n g e puts his problems and the way in which 
we are accustomed to put our problems in some Western European 
countries. The planning in the Netherlands, which I may perhaps 
choose as an example, is rather detailed for the moment, in view of the 
extreme scarcity of foreign exchange and of other factors of production. 
I t  might be that in later years the planning would take the shape of 
a more over-all character. 
Rut for the moment, as I said, there is a great similarity. And I quite 
agree with Dr. Lange that i t  is hardly possible to take decisions only 
on a rational basis. I should like to add, hon-ever, that in free econo-
mies also, there are a number of important decisions that are not 
rational, either. It seemed nevertheless possible, in some cases, somewhat 
to rationalize decisions. 
The first example concerns investments. These were provisionally 
estimated on the basis of the total number of xvorkers for whom employ- 
ment has to be provided in the next five years and the average capital 
per worker that is customary in the Netherlands. 
As a further example, I may perhaps add the example on the plan 
for building schools which was based on forecasts of the number of chil- 
dren to be expected and the need for trained workers. 
Another example is in a similar program for hospitals. 
Tt was possible to some extent to give a background to the rationing 
system of the government, by comparing rations to the budget statis-
tics of prewar times, taking account of a number of corrections. 
Dr. Lange also invited us to answer the question whether i t  wolllcl 
be possible to test the efficiency of this type of semi-planned economies. 
I t  is very difficult indeed, as you can surmise, to malie such a test. One 
rather superficial but riot uninteresticg possibility, however, in the 
case of the Netherlands, seems to be the comparison with Belgium, a 
country uhose economy is much freer than the Dutch economy is at  
present. And now i t  is interesting to state that the velocity with which 
the general index of production for industry has gone up in both coun-
tries since the very low point that was reached in the beginning of 1915 
has been almost the same in both countries. Moreover, price control 
and wage control had far more success in Holland than it had in Bel,' mum. 
On the question raised by Dr. Lange, in what respect i t  woi~ld be pos- 
sible to take more advantage of marginal analysis for advising the govern- 
ment on its economic policy, I should like to answer that, even if we 
did not succeed in finding very fine instruments of distributing resour-
ces, i t  might be not such a terrible accident for this transitory period 
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of great scarcity. Generally speaking, however, I think i t  is too early 
yet to  answer this question. Therefore, collecting experiences as we 
are now doing may be useful for all countries involved. 
M.  Rueff: 
J e  tiens, en premier lieu, it rendre hommage au trbs remarquable 
expose de M. L a n g e. J e  voudrais seulement ajouter une question 
B celles qui lui ont &ti: posies. J e  voudrais qu'il nous indique les 
~nbthodes par lesquelles les previsions du plan peuvent Gtre transformkes 
en rdalit6. 
E n  eFet, en r6gime planifi6, si la conduite des producteurs e t  des con- 
sommateurs n'est pas determinee par des prix tels qu'ils les incitent 
B vouloir spontanement accomplir les actes susceptibles de conduire 
it 1'Qquilibre 6conomique, il faut que ces actes leur soient impos8s. 
Le drame des politiq~ies planifiees dans beaucoup de pays, c'est, qu'en 
fait, producteurs et  consommateurs restent libres do se decider d'aprbs 
les prix du march&, alors que ceux-ci ne sont pas ce qu'ils doivent Gtre 
pour que les previsions du plan soient satisfaites. 
J e  vondrais que M. Lange nous dise quelles mQthodes pratiqaes doi- 
vent Gtre employees pour que le plan soit, en fait, efficace. 
Mr. Domar: 
My remarks are theoretical. dssuming that  our objective is to  
satisfy consumer wants with a minimum of centralized interference, 
the problem of resource allocation falls into two parts: how to deter- 
mine the desirable pattern of behavior on the part of industrial managers, 
and how to  make them hehave in the desirable manner. 
'In eit>her society, the first problem is solved in the well-known manner 
of equating marginal costs to  prices. Tn a capitalist society with per- 
fect competition, the second one is solved by allowing producers to  max- 
imize their profits. The emergence of monopoly (in its several mani-
festations) destroys this solution, and so far no other has really been found. 
I n  a socialist society (according to I.ange and Lerner), the second 
problem is solved by i n~ t r z~e t i nythe managers to equate marginal costs 
to  prices. But  what incentives will society offer to  make them behave 
in this manner? And what method will he used to  determine whether 
they so behave? Surely we cannot merely rely on their sense of duty. 
Nor is i t  practical administrative policy to make a contini~ous study 
of their accounting records: all decisions are made for the future, and 
perfectly honest differences of opinions are possible. I don't believe 
tha t  either our economic theory or Mr. Lange's paper have ansurered 
thess questions. 
-4similar question arises in connection. with uncertainty. We don't 
want the managers to be foolhardy, nor do we want them never to take 
chances. So the punishment for a failure must be severe, but not too 
severe to inhibit experimentation; and the reward for success must be 
generous, but not too generous to encourage waste. I don't know how 
the socialist society will solve this dilemma, yet on its proper solution 
depends its whole economic development and progress. 
For the United States these are academic questions. But they must 
be real and urgent in Europe, and I would like to ask the speakers whe- 
ther much thought has been given to them in their respective countries. 
Mr. Lundberg: 
There is a fundamental difficulty with regard to effective planning 
that I think is on our minds, and is implicitly involved in the speeches 
that we have heard, not least in, Professor L a n g e's lecture. But i t  
has to be said 'explicitly. This difficulty refers to the disturbing fact 
of politics in a free democracy. The concentration of intereet naturally 
tends towards the questions of income distribution on the cost of 
positive planning. I like to draw a parallel with the development of 
planning in Sweden during the postwar years. 
One of the main problems with regard to the future development of 
the Swedish economy refers to the stagnation in population growth. 
There will hardly be any increase for twenty years in our labor force. 
That means great difficulty for a capitalist system to work. One of 
the ways to solve that problem is to get labor from agriculture where 
there are certain reserves. An agricultural planning commission has 
been working for four years with thirty members. 
The economists in that oommission made a dynamic plan for agri-
culture put into a framework of the general Swedish employment de-
velopment. The solution implied a continuous rationalization of agri- 
culture during a period of a generation without danger for our food situa- 
tion. We could calculate the marginal cost of having more of agricul-
ture than according to that plan, that is to say the real price for security 
in food stxpply. But when the politicians got hold of the plan their 
main interest was the equalization of income between agriculture and 
the other parts of the population. I will by this example only remind 
you of the risk that politicians in a free society %rill be much more inter- 
ested in income distribution than in long-term planning because of the 
fact that they to a large extent represent different pressure groups. 
And this of course is very disturbing for long-term planning. My con-
clusion is that in order not only to have good plans made up by experts 
in different fields and consistent planning for the economy as a whole 
but also will and power to make the plans work, u e have either to have 
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an  enlightened dictatorship, if I may say so, or a people very united 
about the aims of economic policy. 
Tf you have a free society, then you can have people united about 
the aims of economic policy under the condition tha t  these aims seem 
predominating to  all of us. That was the situation after the  war in conn- 
tries with large rebuilding and reconstruction problems such as Poland 
and the Netherlands, as Professor T i 11 b e r g e n said. Then you can get 
a general understanding of and common interest in the  plans. I n  Rwe- 
rlen the needs have not been urgent to  the same extent and therefore 
we get too much of the income-(and power-) distribution problems about 
which people cannot easily agree with much room for politicians to  play 
in. However, the Swedish economic policy has not been able to  save 
Sweden from the dollar crisis (partly just because of its emphasis on the 
income-distribution aspects). Although we may regret i t  the new alarm- 
ing ditficulties, breeding urgent needs, will perhaps make better pros- 
pects for efficient planning in the future. 
Mr. Kalecki: 
I think tha t  the basic mistake in this discussion is to  com.pare 
what actually exists to  something tha t  has never existed. The present 
planned or controlled economies are being compared to capitalist econoniy 
as it was pictilred in textbooks until recent. times, where i t  was endawed 
with perfect equalization of marginal cost and prices, sma,ll degree of 
unemployment, optimilm distribution of resources, and so on and so 
forth. I n  fact, i t  was an apologistic myth of the capitalist economy 
and nothing of the sort has ever existed. F'rices were never equal 
to marginal cost; unemployment was consiclerab!e, and so on. It is 
from this point of view tha t  the problems of the  present discrission 
should be considered. 
Talre for instance the problem of the slow response to changes in the 
pattern of demand in a fully employed economy. It is true tha t  in a 
normal capitalist economy this response is very quick; but this is due 
to the fact tha t  usually a significant part  of productive equipment and 
of available labor is unemployed. 
Another problem consid.ered in the  present discussion was whether 
it. would be possible in a planned economy to achieve equalization be-
tween prices and marginal cost. However, i t  is perfectly clear tha t  
in a capitalist economy prices are really not determined tha t  way but 
by average prime cost and something like the  degrec of monopoly or 
by "full cost" principle. Does this assure the optimum distribution 
of resources? Why should we then complain tha.t under planning or 
controls there is no exact equalization between prices and marginal cost 
if this has never been realized? 
I should like still to add a word about devastated countries. I n  con-
sideration of planned and controlled economies in devastated coun-
tries, you have to compare them with what would actually have happen- 
ed if their economies should be "free". An extreme shift to profits from 
other incomes would take place in present circumstances and the demand 
for luxury goods would influence to a great extent the pattern of produc- 
tion. Now, however great are the difficulties of planning production 
in EasternEurope, I still prefer the priorities established by i t  to those 
determined by the demand of black marketeers. 
Mr. Zagorslei: 
The present state of economic planning in Poland, because of the 
enormo~s de~truct~ion When Profes- has certain special characteristics. 
sor L a n g e said that we are in the stage of reconstruction, he did not 
mean what Professor P e r r oux  tried to suggest, that our aim.istorecons- 
truct all that was before, for i t  is not. Every decision as to reconstruc- 
tion is before examiners who know of the changed economic conditions. 
What Professor Lange had in mind is this, that Pola~ld is in this stage 
of intra-marginal decision which means every decision is a right one; 
when the time comes for extra-marginal decisions, and I hope it will he 
very soon, I hope that our distinguished couilsellor will come back to our 
country and help us to get a most efficient and most rationalized and 
optimum economy. For such is, in my opinion,the intention uf the Polish 
Government. However, in my personal opinion, I don't think that 
conditions of the optimum system elaborated by Professor L e r n e r 
and Professor TAange are practicable or are just. I don't think you can 
gather individual cost aggregates into social marginal costs, and I think 
i t  is social marginal costs that must be taken into consideration when 
you try to construct an optimum system. 
As to the question whether we shall ever get an optimum system, or 
whether we shall get an efficient system, of course it is very difficult 
to answer. We can answer only in a comparative way. I t  is certain, 
to me at  least, that  you cannot get an optimum system in a capitalist 
economy. I n  order to get an optimum system in a capitalist economy, 
you must aboiish monopoly profits, and abolishing monopoly profits 
means, of course, abolishing capitalism. I n  our country, as far as  I 
understand i t ,  the chief principle is to equate price^ to average cost. 
There are no monopoly profits in Poland v-orth mentioning, at  least 
in the nationalized sector. And I think, whatever be the ultimate 
conditions for optimum systems, this principle will get us nearer an 
optimum system than the capitalist countries. 
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Mr. Dalal: 
The system of prices fixed freely in the markets to equate supply and 
demand performs, among other functions, that of shifting resources 
from the uses where they are less nrgent to uses where they are more 
urgent, as reflected in the relative price of the different uses of the limi-
ted resources. This function of the price system can be called the 
dynamic function of prices. 
In  derastated economies or economies that are fundamentally disequi- 
libriated, th'e price system fails to perform the djnamic func.tion. Tt is 
often observed that even if the prices offered f(,r the part ic~lar  uses of 
resources rise, thnse resources fail t o  be augmented. The productive 
or distributive system ceases to be sensitive enough to the changes in 
prices. Under these circumstances, when the price system no longer 
performs its dynamic function, there is a logical and economic basis for 
controls and planning to achieve an optimtlm allocation of resources. 
